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ABSTRACT
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act has in recent years greatly expanded
the jurisdiction and reliance on the SEC’s administrative law courts. Despite
the SEC Enforcement Division’s increased caseload and focus on highprofile, complex securities cases, the SEC’s win-rate within the
administrative court has been astronomical, particularly when compared
against its successes before district courts. This success has resulted in
increased criticism by corporations, the defense bar, government actors, and
the courts. In response to this criticism, the SEC has recently proposed
several amendments to its administrative court’s Rules of Practice, which
seek to create a more even adversarial field. While commendable, these
proposed amendments fail to address the underlying concern with the
administrative court: SEC judges appear to be unduly influenced by the
Commission and biased against individual defendants. This lack of
objectivity, whether real or impartial, is a violation of each defendant’s right
to due process. Reform is required, but can only be done through significant
congressional action that formally divorces administrative law judges from
the agencies in which they preside. This Comment examines the real or
perceived biases of the SEC’s administrative law judges. It examines the
principle proposed amendments to the SEC’s Rules of Practice to highlight
the amendments’ failure to alleviate the underlying due process concern in
light of this bias before recommending positive congressional reform in the
shape of a new Department of Administrative Law Judges.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act, legislation designed to
increase transparency within the financial community, greatly expanded the
authority of the Securities Exchange Commission (“SEC”) to enforce
violations of securities law. Dodd-Frank allowed the SEC to collect penalties
against “any person in an administrative proceeding, including unregistered

Vol. 1:1]

Preserving the Impartiality and Constitutionality of SEC ALJs

93

entities and individuals.”1 As a result, the SEC’s Division of Enforcement has
recently experienced an increased caseload. In 2015 alone, the SEC had more
than 550 pending cases.2 The Director of the Enforcement Division, Andrew
Ceresney, has made it clear that the Commission’s litigation docket will only
continue to expand.3 At the same time, in response to pressure from Congress,
the Division has begun implementing an aggressive “broken windows”
enforcement approach that seeks to penalize less egregious, previously-ignored
securities law violations4 by targeting high-profile corporate defendants who
have the resources to zealously advocate their positions.5
Despite this expanding and highly demanding caseload, the SEC has
had an outstanding success rate in its litigated cases. In 2014, for example,
the Commission won 100% of its cases before its administrative law court.6
Additionally, in a recent speech before the New York City Bar White Collar
Institute, Director Ceresney boasted that the Division won twenty-two
consecutive trials in both district and administrative courts, with wins in
twelve out of fourteen jury trials.7 Beyond its team of litigators, the Division
credits this unprecedented success to the evidentiary strength of each case
after extensive investigation by the Division.8
However, critics in both the press and the corporate defense bar
increasingly attribute this success to the Commission’s heavy reliance on its
own administrative courts.9 These critics question the constitutionality of
1

Andrew Ceresney, Dir., U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n Div. of Enforcement, Keynote Speech
at New York City Bar 4th Annual White Collar Institute (May 12, 2015) (transcript available
at https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/ceresney-nyc-bar-4th-white-collar-key-note.html).
See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203, §
929P(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1862-64 (2010).
2
Ceresney, supra note 1.
3
Id.
4
Mary Jo White, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Deploying the Full Enforcement
Arsenal, Address at the Council of Institutional Investors Fall Conference (Sept. 26, 2013)
(transcript available at https://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370539841202).
5
See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Former Goldman Employee Charged With
Insider Trading Before Mergers (Nov. 25, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015267.html; Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Bitcoin Mining Companies
(Dec. 1, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/news/press release/2015-271.html. See also Alexander
Stevenson and Matthew Goldstein, On the Defensive: The S.E.C. Quietly Pursues High-Profile
Cases, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 8, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/10/business/dealbook/onthe-defensive-the-sec-quietly-pursues-high-profile-cases.html?_r=0.
6
Ryan Jones, The Fight Over the Home Court: An Analysis of the SEC’s Increased Use of
Administrative Proceedings, 68 SMU L. REV. 507, 519 (2015).
7
See Ceresney, supra note 1.
8
Id.
9
See, e.g., Daniel Walfish, The Real Problem With SEC Administrative Proceedings, and How
to Fix It, FORBES (July 20, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2015/07/20/the-real-
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these proceedings10 and claim that the administrative court may violate
defendants’ rights to due process.11 These allegations have recently attracted
significant scrutiny beyond the press and into government. The Chamber of
Commerce submitted a white paper to the SEC criticizing the Commission’s
choice of forum as a way to improperly create regulatory policies,12 and one
of the SEC’s own commissioners has respectfully – but pointedly – noted
that a perception problem exists.13 Most notably, courts have now begun to
question the constitutionality of administrative law judge (“ALJ”)
appointments and the objectivity of the ALJs themselves.14
In response to increasing backlash from the corporate defense bar, the
press, and the courts,15 in late September 2015, the Commission submitted for
comment several proposed amendments to its administrative proceedings’ Rules
problem-with-sec-administrative-proceedings-and-how-to-fix-it/ (highlighting the impartiality
concerns regarding SEC administrative law judges); 2015 Mid-Year Securities Enforcement
Update, GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP (July 13, 2015), http://www.gibsondunn.
com/publications/documents/2015-Mid-Year-Securities-Enforcement-Update.pdf (outlining the
problematic nature of administrative proceedings evidentiary and timeline concerns).
10
See infra notes 86-100 and accompanying text.
11
Compare Order Concerning Additional Submission and Protective Order, Timbervest,
LLC, Joel Barth Shapiro, Walter William Anthony Boden, III, Donald David Zell, Jr., and
Gordon Jones II, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 4103, Investment Company Act
Release No. 31660, 2015 WL 3507107 (June 4, 2015),
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/opinions/2015/ia-4103.pdf (inviting SEC ALJ Cameron
Elliott to submit an affidavit affirming his belief that he was under no pressure to decide in
the Commission’s favor) with Jean Eaglesham, SEC Wins With In-House Judges, WALL ST.
J. (May 6, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-wins-with-in-house-judges-1430965803
[hereinafter Eaglesham, In-House Judges] (listing allegations that former ALJs came "under
fire" for ruling against the Commission and were questioned about their loyalty if they did
not assume that “the burden was on the [respondents] to show that they didn't do what the
agency said they did”).
12
U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, EXAMINING U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
ENFORCEMENT: RECOMMENDATIONS ON CURRENT PROCESSES AND PRACTICES 14 (2015),
http://www.centerforcapitalmarkets.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/021882_SEC_
Reform_FIN1.pdf.
13
Michael Piwowar, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, A Fair, Orderly, and Efficient
SEC, Remarks at the “SEC Speaks” Conference 2015 (Feb. 20, 2015) (transcript available
at https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/022015-spchcmsp.html) (advocating for forum choices
that do not create the perception of inequitable forum shopping).
14
See sources cited supra note 11.
15
See, e.g., Hazel Bradford, SEC on Defensive Following Setback on Use of Hearings,
PENSIONS & INVS. (March 9, 2015, http://www.pionline.com/article/20150629/PRINT/
306299976/sec-on-defensive-following-setback-on-use-of-hearings (discussing Senator
Elizabeth Warren’s criticism of the SEC leadership and the injunction in Hill v. SEC); Marc
J. Fagel, The State of SEC Enforcement Heading into 2015, INSIGHTS: THE CORPORATE &
SECURITIES LAW ADVISOR, Feb. 2015, at 1 (criticizing the explosion of administrative
proceedings in recent years and highlighting impartiality and due process concerns).
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of Practice.16 Many of these amendments respond directly to the almost
universally approved recommendations for reform put forth by corporations and
the defense bar.17 Most importantly, these amendments (1) conform certain
evidentiary requirements to the Administrative Procedure Act,18 (2) allow
defendants to take limited depositions,19 (3) double the length of the prehearing
(discovery) period during administrative proceedings,20 and (4) provide a
timeline for the disposition of cases by the ALJ.21
The proposed amendments, while commendable and likely to lessen
concerns from both the court and the corporate bar, fall short of providing
defendants an equal footing to adequately vindicate their claims.22 It is not
enough for the Commission to conform to the standards in the Administrative
Procedure Act or to the processes of other, less polemic agencies. Whether
an amendment changes an evidentiary standard or modifies the timeline for
disposition, that change will still create a standard that will require judicial
discretion. However, the underlying frustration with the Commission’s
administrative courts lies in a perception that administrative judges are, or
appear to be, beholden to Commissioners who have publicly claimed that
their judges are mere agency employees. In this regard, the proposed
amendments do little to overcome the real concern facing the SEC.
In light of this reality, greater reform is required. An objective
adjudicator is a necessary aspect of due process,23 and as long as there is a
potential for ALJs to be unduly influenced by the agency in which they serve,
defendants in administrative cases will be denied that process. This is true not
only in the SEC, but in any administrative forum where there is an opportunity
for an ALJ to be influenced by those with power. Such levels of reform are not
within the agency’s power, despite their well-intentioned efforts.
16

Amendments to the Commission’s Rules of Practice, 80 Fed. Reg. 60,091 (proposed Oct.
5, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 201).
17
See, e.g., U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 12, at 3-8.
18
Id. at 18, 53.
19
Id. at 7, 44.
20
Id. at 5, 54.
21
Id. at 24, 60.
22
See COVINGTON & BURLING, THE SEC’S PROPOSED MODERNIZATION OF ITS RULES FOR
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS (Sept. 28, 2015), https://www.cov.com/-/media/files/corp
orate/publications/2015/09/the_secs_proposed_modernization_of_its_rules_for_administrat
ive_proceedings.pdf (noting the time difference in the SEC’s ability to prepare in conjunction
with respondents); SEC Moves in the Right Direction with Proposed Amendments to Rules
Governing Administrative Proceedings, But the Changes Do Not Go Far Enough, GIBSON,
DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP (Sept. 18, 2015), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/doc
uments/SEC-Proposed-Amendments-to-Rules-Governing-Administrative-Proceedings.
pdf (discussing the continued inability for respondents to fully defend themselves).
23
Marshall v. Jerrico, 446 U.S. 238 (1980).
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Instead, Congress must recognize the reality of this country’s vast
administrative adjudicatory regime. A majority of judicial proceedings occur
in non-Article III courts: in 2013, for example, 363,914 civil and criminal
cases were filed in federal district courts,24 while the Social Security
Administration alone heard over 700,000.25 Each of these 700,000 cases is
presided over by an Article I administrative judge, who is assigned to a
particular agency and works within the bureaucratic framework of the
agency, just as ALJs function within the SEC. This framework creates a
system with the potential for constant undue influence.
Congress could remove this specter of impartiality by creating a new
administrative agency to appoint, remove, and house its Article I judges.
Currently, each team of ALJs are housed in an Office of Administrative Law
Judges (“OALJ”) within a particular agency, but most administrative matters
pertaining to ALJ employment are primarily conducted through the U.S. Office
of Personnel Management. By relocating each agency’s OALJ into a new
“Department of Administrative Law Judges,” Congress can remove the stain
of partiality and grant defendants their right to due process without greatly
increasing government spending. Moreover, in light of recent concerns about
the constitutionality of ALJ appointments, a new department would ensure the
continued use of these vital government employees while simultaneously
avoiding the need to further strip ALJs of their independence.
This Comment discusses why the SEC’s proposed amendments to its
Rules of Practice cannot assuage the true due process concerns facing its
administrative proceedings. Section I provides a foundational overview of the
SEC’s administrative court process, which highlights the degree of discretion
of SEC administrative judges. Section II discusses the perceived bias
currently associated with SEC ALJs and how that bias hinders the
Commission’s Proposal from realizing true fairness in the administrative
court. This Section is broken into two parts: (a) a discussion on the perceived
and actual biases of the administrative judges, and (b) a dissection of the most
pertinent proposed amendments and how they fail to alleviate current
procedural concerns in the light of perceived or actual judicial bias. Finally,
Section III proposes a solution to this problem through the creation of a new
administrative department.

24

Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-repor
ts/federal-judicial-caseload-statistics-2013 (last visited May 11, 2016).
25
Information About SSA’s Office of Disability Adjudication and Review, U.S. Soc.
Security Admin., https://www.ssa.gov/appeals/about_odar.html (last visited May 25, 2016).
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II. THE SEC’S ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS
Every securities investigation begins in the same manner, irrespective
of whether the SEC elects to resolve a case in the district courts or its own
administrative forum. Interwoven throughout this process are the actions and
rulings of the ALJs, whose jurisdiction in recent years has been significantly
expanded. For example, the Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny
Stock Reform Act of 1990 expanded the jurisdiction of ALJ proceedings to
include registered firms, broker-dealers, and investment advisors.26 Then,
Dodd-Frank augmented that power to include all persons within the SEC’s
jurisdiction, which extends to claims from registered firms to associated,
unregistered defendants.27 As a result, nearly any person who has even
collateral dealings with securities is under the jurisdiction of the
administrative courts and the ALJs, who have the power to issue fines and
injunctions, order disgorgements, oversee entire proceedings, rule on
constitutional questions, and make final findings of fact.28
This process begins with the Office of Compliance Inspections and
Examinations ("OCIE"), which oversees the SEC’s National Examination
Program (“NEP”) and functions as the initial actor in investigations and
compliance assurance.29 If in the course of an inspection, an OCIE staff member
determines that there is a potential securities violation, the OCIE will refer the
matter to the Enforcement Division, which launches an investigation30 that can
last for months or years.31 At the conclusion of both formal and informal
investigations, the Division staff typically provides a “Wells notice” of its
preliminary decision to the Commission.32 Within 180 days of this notice, SEC
staff must either file an enforcement action memo or notify the Enforcement
Division Director of its recommendation not to act.33
26

Pub. L. No. 101-429, 104 Stat. 931 (1990).
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 929p.
28
David Zaring, Enforcement Discretion at the SEC, 94 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 115-118) (on file with author) (describing judicial powers of administrative law judges).
29
About Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations, U.S. Sec. & Exchange
Commission, http://www.sec.gov/ocie/Article/about.html (last visited May 11, 2016).
30
17 C.F.R. § 202.5(c) (2015). See also D. OCIE Referrals to Enforcement Implications,
PORTFOLIO 283: THE SEC, THE DOJ AND INVESTMENT ADVISERS: THE EXAMINATION AND
ENFORCEMENT REGIME, available at Bloomberg BNA, Securities Practice Portfolio Series.
31
See generally Federal Court Management Statistics, USCOURTS.GOV, http://www.uscourts.gov/
statistics-reports/analysis-reports/federal-court-management-statistics (last visited May 11, 2016).
32
See Background, PORTFOLIO 281: THE SEC ENFORCEMENT PROCESS: PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE IN HANDLING AN SEC INVESTIGATION, available at Bloomberg BNA, Securities
Practice Portfolio Series. It should also be noted that the SEC reserves the right not to
provide a Wells notice.
33
15 U.S.C. § 78d-5(a) (2012).
27
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The Enforcement Division may only bring civil enforcement against a
defendant.34 If the Enforcement Division does elect to seek penalties, it must
decide whether to bring action in a federal district court or before one of the
Commission’s administrative law judges.35 The Division’s considerable latitude
to choose its own forum is integral to this decision and greatly affects the number
of cases that will appear before an ALJ. The Commission has outlined four main
criteria36 it uses for forum selection that, while not exhaustive, aid in determining
which cases will go before the Commission’s ALJs.37 While certain theories or
claims are proscribed from being litigated in the administrative forum,38 such as
when a statute requires that the case be brought before an Article III tribunal,
most criteria favor appearance before an ALJ. For example, if the potential
defendant is an entity required to register with the SEC or is a person associated
with such an entity, the Commission is more likely to try such cases before an
ALJ, who has “developed extensive knowledge and experience” on these
issues.39 Of course, this also encompasses an overwhelming majority of
enforcement cases.40 Additionally, the Commission may consider cost,
resources, and time when balancing which forum to use. Because appearances
before ALJs are truncated proceedings, this factor almost uniformly favors an
administrative proceeding. When weighing these factors together, it is
unsurprising that the SEC is increasingly electing to bring cases before its
administrative court.
An entire administrative proceeding, which is calculated from the
initial notice of proceedings to the publication of an initial decision, may last
either 120, 210, or 300 days, or from about three to ten months.41 These
timeframes are notably shorter than district court proceedings, where the
34

How Investigations Work, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https://www.sec.gov/
News/Article/Detail/Article/1356125787012 (last visited May 12, 2016).
35
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, DIVISION OF ENFORCEMENT APPROACH TO FORUM
SELECTION IN CONTESTED ACTIONS 1 (2015), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/
enforcement-approach-forum-selection-contested-actions.pdf.
36
These criteria are: (1) the availability of the desired claims, legal theories, and forms of
relief in each forum; (2) whether any charged party is a registered entity or an individual
associated with a registered entity; (3) the cost-, resource-, and time-effectiveness of
litigation in each forum; and (4) fair, consistent, and effective resolution of securities law
issues and matters. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 35.
37
Id. at 1-2.
38
Id. at 3-4.
39
Id. at 3.
40
Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, supra note 25 (describing SEC enforcement actions
brought in 2015, which show that approximately half of all enforcements include filing
delinquencies and penalties against issuers and that the remaining 50% are largely comprised of
persons and entities who are connected to or are registered with the Commission).
41
17 C.F.R. § 201.360 (2015).

Vol. 1:1]

Preserving the Impartiality and Constitutionality of SEC ALJs

99

median length of a trial lasts approximately three to seven years.42 The
specific administrative duration is dependent upon the SEC’s enforcement
power. Generally, registration violations are 120-day cases, sanctions arising
out of injunctions or convictions are 210 days, and violations of securities
law are 300 days.43 The duration of each stage of a proceeding – pre-hearing,
hearing, and post-hearing44 – is delineated in the Commission’s Rules of
Practice.45 Notably, discretion to extend the time period for this process to
fairly meet the needs of both parties lies with the administrative judge.
When the Commissioners vote to pursue enforcement through an
administrative proceeding, the SEC notifies the defendant by issuing an
“order to institute proceedings.”46 This order gives reasonable notice of the
upcoming hearing, the nature of the proceedings, jurisdictional and legal
statements of authority, as well as any factual matters to be considered during
the hearing47 in a similar manner as in the district courts. Through this order,
the Commission will also notify the defendant which case schedule the
administrative law judge will follow throughout the proceedings.48
The pre-hearing period begins upon service of the order to institute
proceedings. A defendant has 21 days to file an answer from service of that order,49
which is significantly shorter than the 60-day time period for district court.50 The
administrative law judge then schedules a pre-hearing conference51 similar to the
district court’s Rule 16 pre-trial conferences,52 and the discovery phase begins.
Under the original rules, discovery was incredibly limited.53 Whereas district
courts require parties to share with their adversary any relevant, non-privileged
evidence that supports their own case,54 the SEC had greater leeway to withhold
42

This estimate uses an average of the median time of a case from filing to disposition with an
emphasis on the United States District Court for the Southern District and Eastern Districts of
New York, which are most likely to prosecute securities litigation. U.S. COURTS, U.S. DISTRICT
COURTS COMBINED CIVIL AND CRIMINAL FEDERAL COURT MANAGE-MENT STATISTICS (2015),
http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/na/federal-court-management-statistics/2015/06/30-3.
43
17 C.F.R. § 201.360(a). See also Amendments to the Commission’s Rules of Practice, 80
Fed. Reg. at 60,091-92.
44
17 C.F.R. § 201.360(a). See also Amendments to the Commission’s Rules of Practice, 80
Fed. Reg. at 60,092.
45
See 17 C.F.R. § 201.360(a).
46
17 C.F.R. § 201.200(a)(1).
47
17 C.F.R. § 201.200(b)(3).
48
17 C.F.R. § 201.360(a).
49
17 C.F.R. § 200.360.
50
FED.R.CIV.P. 12(a)(ii).
51
17 C.F.R. § 201.221.
52
FED.R.CIV.P. 16.
53
17 C.F.R. § 201.360.
54
FED.R.CIV.P. 26(a),(b)
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privileged materials that will still be used against a party.55 Defendants were also
limited in other ways – for example, defendants could not take any depositions
for the proceeding,56 and must instead rely on the subpoena process.57 The
Commission (which had months to build a case, interview witnesses, conduct
searches, and test theories), had greater access to impeachable material.
At the close of the pre-hearing period, the scheduled hearing before the
ALJ begins. The hearing functions similarly to a bench trial before a district court
judge, with a few key exceptions. A party is entitled to present its case and
defenses through oral or documentary evidence and rebuttal evidence.58
However, a party may only conduct a cross-examination if, in the ALJ’s
discretion, it is necessary to obtain a “full and true disclosure of the facts.”59
Originally, hearsay evidence was allowed if the ALJ determines that it is not
“irrelevant, immaterial or unduly repetitious.”60 Under the new rules, hearsay
will only be permissible if it also “bears satisfactory indicia of reliability so that
its use is fair,”61 which is also determined by the ALJ.62
At the end of the hearing, parties are permitted to submit a brief with
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law using specific citations in the
record.63 Transcripts of the hearing may be purchased by defendants.64 The ALJ
determines which party must file first65 – the first party to file has 30 days from
the conclusion of the hearing, while the opposing side must file within 90 days.66
The ALJ has 120, 210, or 300 days from the initial notice to present his or her
initial decision, but this deadline can be extended for cause.67 Finally, defendants
may appeal the decision to the Commission68 and then to the district court.69
55

17 C.F.R. § 201.230(a)(1), (b).
17 C.F.R. § 201.233(b).
57
17 C.F.R. § 201.232.
58
17 C.F.R. § 201.326.
59
Id. See also Amendments to the Commission’s Rules of Practice, 80 Fed. Reg. at 60,104.
60
17 C.F.R. § 201.320. See also Calais Res., Inc., Securities Act Release No. 67312, 104 SEC
Docket 12-18 (June 29, 2012) (“Hearsay is admissible in administrative proceedings, and ‘we
evaluate such evidence based on its probative value, its reliability and the fairness of its use.’”)
(citing Leslie A. Arouh, Exchange Act Release No. 62898, 99 SEC Docket 32306, 32323 (Sept.
13, 2010)).
61
Amendments to the Commission’s Rules of Practice, 80 Fed. Reg. at 60,104.
62
Id. at 60, 095.
63
17 C.F.R. § 201.340(b).
64
17 C.F.R. § 201.302(b) (“Transcripts of public hearings shall be available for purchase at
prescribed rates.”)
65
17 C.F.R. § 201.340(a), (c).
66
17 C.F.R. § 201.340(c)(1), (2).
67
See supra note 29 and accompanying text. See also 17 C.F.R. § 201.360(b).
68
17 C.F.R. § 201.411(a).
69
Id.
56
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SEC prosecutors are incredibly successful under this administrative
regime. For the cases that prosecutors do lose, they have historically
succeeded in the appeals process. The Commissioners who originally voted
to initiate enforcement have authority to review or reverse the ALJ’s findings
on appeal, and the Commission affirms an ALJ’s initial findings 95% of
time.70 While the SEC argues that such win rates are overblown because
prosecutors fail to receive every single aspect of relief sought,71 this process
garners significantly more favorable results than in district court, where
Commission prosecutor success rate was 67% in 2012, 75% in 2013, and 61%
in 2014.72
Perhaps unsurprisingly, these successes have caused significant
criticism about (1) the SEC’s motivations when using their administrative
proceedings, (2) the impartiality of the presiding administrative law judges,
and (3) the questionable procedural rules during the hearing itself. The
following Section discusses these concerns, beginning with the perceived and
actual bias of SEC administrative judges.
III. CONCERNS OVER PROCESS:
IMPARTIALITY AND THE RIGHT TO A DEFENSE
Whether appearing before a district court or an administrative
proceeding, a defendant is entitled to two inherent aspects of due process: (1) the
right to present a defense,73 and (2) the right to present that defense before an
impartial judge.74 There is significant concern that these fundamental rights have
been abridged by the lopsided nature of the SEC’s Rules of Practice,75 as well as
a perceived or real lack of objectivity by SEC administrative judges.
70

Tessa Stillings, Development Articles, Are the SEC’s Administrative Law Courts
Constitutional?: Recent Developments in the SEC’s Increased Use of Administrative
Proceedings, 35 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 96, 100 (2015).
71
Zaring, supra note 28, at 137.
72
Eaglesham, In-House Judges, supra note 11.
73
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967) (“right to present a defense, the right to
present the defendant's version of the facts as well as the prosecution's” to determine “where
the truth lies…is a fundamental element of due process of law”).
74
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 556 U.S. 868, 876 (2009) (“It is axiomatic that ‘a
fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.’”).
75
See SEC Moves in the Right Direction with Proposed Amendments to Rules Governing
Administrative Proceedings, But the Changes Do Not Go Far Enough, supra note 22
(discussing the continued inability for respondents to fully defend themselves); Ed Beeson,
SEC Proposes to ‘Modernize’ In-House Court, LAW360 (Sept. 24, 2015), http://www.law
360.com/articles/707076/sec-proposes-to-modernize-in-house-court (highlighting the
major criticisms of the SEC’s current rules of practice); Elizabeth P. Gray, SEC Attempts to
Address Due Process Concerns, LAW360 (Sept. 24, 2015), http://www.law360.com/art
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As previously discussed, the rules of evidence and procedure typically
required in district courts are relaxed in an administrative proceeding,76 which
makes it easier for prosecutors to admit inculpatory evidence. The procedural
timing is also vastly accelerated when compared to the district court,77 and leaves
defense counsel with weeks or months to defend a charge which the Commission
has built for months or years. Finally, and most importantly, the discretion to
include or exclude evidence, the discretion to affirm or extend deadlines, and the
discretion to ultimately decide the primary contested matters lies with an
administrative law judge who may be beholden to the prosecuting agency.78
This framework, along with the astronomic success rate for Commission
staff, has created an either real or perceived unfairness in cases that come before
SEC administrative law judges.79 To its credit, the SEC has proposed several
amendments that seek to streamline their administrative proceedings and level
the playing field for defendants.80 However, while these proposed amendments
represent necessary progress towards a more even-handed process, the
amendments cannot alleviate the second – and distinct – concern of impartiality.
Without addressing this second concern, the amendments function as mere
bandages to mollify increasingly loud skepticism.
This Section explores the tension between a defendant’s truncated ability
to present a defense and concerns surrounding bias. It discusses the
constitutionally problematic issue of perceived and actual bias of an adjudicator,
and outlines a defendant’s right to present a defense. This will provide context
for the following Section’s discussion of how the SEC’s proposed amendments
aim to lessen concerns associated with the right to present a defense in SEC
proceedings, and how the amendments ultimately fail achieve that goal.

icles/707917/sec-attempts-to-address-due-process-concerns (outlining the three primary
categories of change incorporated by the SEC’s Proposed Amendments).
76
See supra, notes 40-69 and accompanying text. Compare FED.R.EVID. 801-804 (outlining
the disallowance of hearsay and the specific exceptions to the hearsay rule) with 17 C.F.R. §
201.360 (2015) (allowing the general use of hearsay).
77
Compare FEDERMAN & SHERWOOD, THE MULTIPLE STAGES OF SECURITIES LITIGATION 2
(May 15, 2013), http://www.federmanlaw.com/Websites/federmanlaw/images/Securities
LitigationProgression.pdf (describing the discovery process as taking at least one to two
years) with 17 C.F.R. § 201.360 (outlining the timeline in an administrative proceeding
before the SEC).
78
See Notice of Filing, Timbervest, LLC, Joel Barth Shapiro, Walter William Anthony
Boden, III, Donald David Zell, Jr., and Gordon Jones II, Administrative Proceeding File No.
3-15519 (June 4, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/apdocuments/3-15519-event-139.
pdf (describing the hiring process for administrative law judges).
79
See infra footnotes 87-101 and accompanying text.
80
Amendments to the Commission’s Rules of Practice, 80 Fed. Reg. at 60,091-107.
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A. The Impartial Judge
“The Due Process Clauses entitles a person to an impartial and
disinterested tribunal in both civil and criminal cases.”81 An impartial judge is
essential both to ensure the appearance of fairness and ensure that cases are not
determined by a distorted image of the facts.82 Without a dispassionate
administrative law judge presiding over the tribunal, or without the appearance
of one, the proceeding cannot be considered “fair.”83 Currently, defendants
appearing before the SEC’s administrative courts are faced with this perception
of unfairness. This is a violation of due process that has not been addressed in
the Commission’s proposed amendments, and, as such, cannot truly assuage the
procedural concerns associated with the forum.84
Like most administrative agencies, the SEC faces constant criticism
surrounding the implementation of its administrative courts. However, in mid2015, tensions with the SEC escalated in the wake of several Wall Street Journal
exposés that brought these concerns to the general public.85 The articles highlight
the different success rates between the initial administrative law court decisions
and the district courts (90% vs. 69%) and the different success rates in appeals
to the Commission (95%).86
In one article, a former SEC judge was quoted saying that the judges
were to assume that “the burden was on the people who were accused to show
that they didn’t do what the agency said they did,” and judges who deviated
from this standard would have their loyalty questioned by the Chief
Administrative Law Judge.87 This presents a serious violation of the standard
of proof – that it is the Commission that bears the burden to establish the
defendant’s fault, typically by a preponderance of evidence.88 Previous
81

Marshall v. Jerrico, 446 U.S. 238 (1980).
Id.
83
Id.
84
See Barry R. Goldsmith, SEC Proposed Amendment to Rules for Administrative Proceedings,
HARV. L. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Oct. 15, 2015), https://corpgov.law.harvard.
edu/2015/10/15/sec-proposes-amendments-to-rules-for-administrative-proceedings/ (highlightting the incremental gains of the proposed amendments compared to the needs of respondents).
85
See, e.g., Eaglesham, In-House Judges, supra note 11. See Jean Eaglesham, “Deflategate”
Judge Urges SEC to Investigate In-House Tribunal, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 17, 2015),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/deflategate-judge-urges-sec-to-investigate-in-house-tribunal1442512351; Jean Eaglesham, Judge Adds to Pressure on SEC Over How It Names Its
Judges, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 3, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/another-court-tells-sec-toreconsider-how-it-names-its-judges-1438625510.
86
Eaglesham, In-House Judges, supra note 11.
87
Id.
88
This preponderance standard is typical in administrative proceedings. See Steadman v.
SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 103-04 (1981) (outlining the allowance of a preponderance standard by
82
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commissioners have also weighed in, saying that “the SEC judges aren’t
deliberately biased,” but that “the system itself appears inherently skewed
toward the agency,”89 and that the increased authority granted by Dodd-Frank
represented “a fundamental change” in enforcement.90
Criticism of the SEC’s administrative law judges reached its peak in July
2015 with the case In re Timbervest.91 Timbervest LLC, a real estate brokerage
firm, and four of its brokers were charged with failing to disclose brokerage
fees.92 In his initial decision, ALJ Cameron Elliott found that all parties had
violated the law and ordered approximately $1.9 million in disgorgement.93
Timbervest appealed this initial decision to the Commission to challenge, among
other things, Judge Elliott’s bias as an administrative law judge.94 Citing the Wall
Street Journal article SEC Wins with In-House Judges (which noted that Judge
Elliott had never decided in a defendant’s favor) and several questionable
evidentiary and credibility determinations made in the Commission’s favor,95
Timbervest argued that the “administrative forum lacks impartiality.”96
To combat this argument, the Enforcement Division requested that
Judge Elliott submit an affidavit “addressing whether he has had any
communications or experienced any pressure similar to that alleged in the
[article]” and whether he was aware of any bias.97 Judge Elliott promptly
declined to submit an affidavit disavowing that such pressures existed.98
the Administrative Procedure Act and the SEC’s continued, and acceptable, use of that
standard in its administrative proceedings).
89
Jean Eaglesham, Fairness of SEC Judges Is in Spotlight, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 22, 2015), http://
www.wsj.com/articles/fairness-of-sec-judges-is-in-spotlight-1448236970 [hereinafter Eaglesham,
Fairness] (discussing former Commissioner Thomas McGonigle’s views on SEC judges).
90
Eaglesham, In-House Judges, supra note 11 (discussing former Commissioner Joseph
Grundfest’s views on the current state of the administrative proceedings).
91
Timbervest, LLC, Joel Barth Shapiro, Walter William Anthony Boden, III, Donald David
Zell, Jr., and Gordon Jones II, Initial Decision Release No. 658, 2014 WL 4090371 (ALJ
Aug. 20, 2014) (initial decision), https://www.sec.gov/alj/aljdec/2014/id658ce.pdf.
92
Id. at 2. This failure violated Section 206(1) and (2) of the Investment Advisers Act of
1940, and the four individuals were charged with aiding and abetting this violation.
93
Id.
94
Timbervest, LLC, Joel Barth Shapiro, Walter William Anthony Boden, III, Donald David
Zell, Jr., and Gordon Jones II, Initial Decision Release No. 658, 2014 WL 4090371, at 3738 (ALJ Aug. 20, 2014) (initial decision), https://www.sec.gov/alj/aljdec/2014/id658ce.pdf.
95
Eaglesham, In-House Judges, supra note 11.
96
Order Concerning Additional Submission and Protective Order, Timbervest, LLC, Joel Barth
Shapiro, Walter William Anthony Boden, III, Donald David Zell, Jr., and Gordon Jones II,
Investment Advisers Act Release No. 4103, Investment Company Act Release No. 31660, 2015
WL 3507107 (June 4, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/opinions/2015/ia-4103.pdf.
97
Id. at *2.
98
Jean Eaglesham, SEC Judge Declines to Submit Affidavit of No Bias, WALL ST. J. (June
11, 2015), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2015/06/11/sec-judge-declines-to-submit-
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Some within the SEC explained this refusal as Judge Elliott’s desire to avoid
a political quagmire, but the judge’s denial unleashed a second firestorm of
articles from journalists, defense counsel, and bloggers on the problematic
nature of biased administrative judges.99
These concerns are not meritless. While Supreme Court precedent has
cautioned that “most matters relating to judicial disqualification do not rise
to a constitutional level,”100 a judge cannot fairly preside over a trial in which
he has “a direct, personal, substantial pecuniary interest.”101 Such pecuniary
interests are often deemed constitutionally suspect because of the personal
nature of the judge’s interest, as intimated by the maxim nemo iudex in sua
causa, or “no man should be judge in his own case.”102 And so, while it is
true that evidence showing pressure may have been exerted to induce ALJs
rule in certain ways does not equate to a direct pecuniary interest, such
pressure does represent a clear proprietary interest in the actual and
reputational standing of an ALJ within the SEC, and should be treated as
equally problematic.
Holdings that do not recognize this as a legitimate due process
concern remove practical avenues of proving bias in this context. ALJs are
presumed to be unbiased (as the Commission stated in upholding Judge
Elliot’s initial decision in Timbervest).103 That presumption can only be
overcome when there is a clear conflict of interest or other reason for
disqualification.104 Unfortunately, to show this, a defendant would have to
affidavit-of-no-bias/ (describing Judge Elliott’s single-sentence email sent to the SEC in
response to their request stating “I respectfully decline to submit the affidavit requested”).
99
See, e.g., Jean Eaglesham, SEC Judge Declines to Submit Affidavit of No Bias, WALL ST. J.
(June 11, 2015), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2015/06/11/sec-judge-declines-to-submitaffidavit-of-no-bias/ (discussing the mounting pressure of the SEC’s use of its administrative law
judges and calling Judge Elliott’s declination “unprecedented”); Stephanie Russell-Kraft, SEC
Asks SEC Judge If He Is Biased Towards SEC, LAW360 (June 4, 2015), http://
www.law360.com/articles/664093/sec-asks-sec-judge-if-he-is-biased-towards-sec (mocking the
Commission’s request to ask Judge Elliott to state that he is unbiased); SEC Inspector General
Reveals Investigation Into Possible Bias of SEC ALJs, SECURITIES DIARY (Aug. 10, 2015),
http://securitiesdiary.com/2015/08/10/sec-inspector-general-reveals-investigation-into-possiblebias-of-sec-aljs/ (speculating on the future use of the Commission’s administrative courts).
100
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 556 U.S. 868, 876 (2009) (quoting FTC v.
Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 702 (1948)).
101
Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
102
Zaring, supra note 28 at 117.
103
Timbervest, LLC, Joel Barth Shapiro, Walter William Anthony Boden, III, Donald David
Zell, Jr., and Gordon Jones II, Initial Decision Release No. 658, 2014 WL 4090371, at 37
(ALJ Aug. 20, 2014) (initial decision), https://www.sec.gov/alj/aljdec/2014/id658ce.pdf
(citing Shweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 195 (1982) and Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35,
47 (1975)).
104
Shweiker, 456 U.S. at 195.
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prove that “the ALJ’s behavior, in the context of the whole case, was ‘so
extreme as to display clear inability to render fair judgment.’”105
This standard creates an unwinnable scenario for the individual
defendant in a particular case because here, impartiality does not just involve
one particular administrative law judge in a given case. Rather, as former
commissioner Thomas McGonigle mentioned, it is the overall inherently
skewed nature of the Commission’s administrative courts.106 A defendant
cannot rely solely on the particular judge’s decision rates107 or particular
evidentiary rulings when the problem lies within a pervasive culture of
loyalty to and bias in favor of the Commission. Thus, while the bias is evident
in statistics, it will likely evade review and continue throughout the SEC’s
proceedings.
This bias, whether perceived or actual, taints the entire
administrative process and, as discussed more extensively below, is the
reason why the current proposed rules are insufficient to alleviate the
concerns currently facing the SEC’s administrative courts. The newly
proposed amendments create higher evidentiary standards and increase the
ALJs’ discretion to extend deadlines for the purpose of enhancing fairness.
However, this goal is only achieved if the presiding judge is objective, and
a judge cannot be impartial when he or she is expected to view all cases
with a perceived assumption of the defendant’s guilt and preference towards
the Commission.
B. The Right to Present a Defense
Turning now to the specific amendment proposals, it is important to
reiterate the progressive steps that the SEC’s amendments represent. The
proposal is extensive, but many amendments function as support for the
efficient application of the primary proposals within the Rule scheme.108
Generally, these primary amendments seek to (1) conform certain evidentiary
requirements to the Administrative Procedure Act,109 (2) allow defendants to
105

Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 858 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Liteky v. United States,
510 U.S. 540, 551 (1994)). Accord Keith v. Barnhart, 473 F.3d 782, 788 (7th Cir. 2007).
106
Eaglesham, Fairness, supra note 89 (quoting former Commissioner Thomas McGonigle).
107
Moreover, it is “almost never” constitutionally insufficient to rely solely on a judge’s
record. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 541 (1994).
108
For example, proposals 180, 221, 234 all function to support Rule 233’s amendments to
allowing depositions These proposals update administrative requirements and deadlines that
would otherwise unduly burdensome in light of the changes. See Amendments to the
Commission’s Rules of Practice, 80 Fed. Reg. at 60,100, 60,101, and 60,104.
109
Id. at 60,104.
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take limited depositions,110 (3) double the length of the prehearing (discovery)
period during administrative proceedings,111 and (4) provide a timeline for the
disposition of cases by the ALJ.112 Underlying each of these changes is a
desire to provide defendants greater fact-finding abilities and to alleviate the
concerns associated with the abbreviated nature of many aspects of the
proceeding by either changing a previous standard or granting an ALJ the
discretion to determine the fairest outcome on a case-by-case basis.
The core usefulness of many of these amendments is the increased
discretion of the administrative judge to fairly balance the needs of both
parties in service to the case. However, when the judges granted that
discretion are, or appear to be, working in service of the Commission,
increased discretion serves as yet another hurdle for defendants. The SEC has
recognized that hardline rules and deadlines fail to encapsulate the
complexity of most cases, and without this discretion, the Proposed Rules
would not do enough. Ironically, however, the increased discretion proposed
in these amendments only augment fairness concerns.
For example, Rule 340 allows the administrative judge to determine
which party must first file any post-hearing briefs.113 There are tactical
advantages to filing either first or second, but the party who files second is given
90 days to respond, whereas the first to file has only 30 days.114 This rule allows
the judge to determine which side may need more time to respond based on
legitimate reasons, but that discretion is tainted by the perceived bias of the judge
who may be pressured to choose sides out of loyalty to the Commission.115 The
only way to combat this would to be to allow the same amount of time for each
brief, which does not leave room to consider legitimate needs by each party.
These evidentiary, discovery, and timing concerns can all be
categorized as “the right to present a defense.”116 Alone, none of these
procedural questions can withstand a constitutional due process challenge.117
However, within each line of precedent, the Court has recognized that there
is a point at which each concern becomes constitutionally problematic and
together, in combination with ALJ biases, the entire process begins to appear
110

Id. at 60,092.
Id. at 60,104.
112
Id. at 60,106.
113
17 C.F.R. § 201.340(a), (c) (2015).
114
17 C.F.R. § 201.340(c)(1), (2).
115
Eaglesham, In-House Judges, supra note 11 (recounting an SEC Chief ALJ questioning
another ALJ’s loyalty after certain rulings).
116
MARK MAHONEY, THE RIGHT TO PRESENT A DEFENSE 1 (2009).
117
See notes 118-150 and accompanying text (highlighting the potential due process
concerns associated with the SEC’s original rules for evidentiary standards, depositions, and
deadlines).
111
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suspicious. The following Sections will discuss the specific constitutional
concerns surrounding the SEC’s proposed rules for allowing hearsay,
abbreviating discovery, and limiting depositions.
i. Hearsay
The first significant distinction between district court proceedings
and SEC administrative proceedings are the rules surrounding hearsay. In
federal court, hearsay – an out of court statement used to provide the truth
of a particular matter118 – is generally impermissible.119 This is not true in
administrative proceedings. The SEC’s Rule of Practice 320 states that “the
hearing officer may receive relevant evidence and shall exclude all evidence
that is irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious,” 120 which, like most
other administrative proceedings, allows the admission of hearsay
evidence.121
It is well-established that hearsay, on its own, does not create a
procedural due process violation. The Commission, the Administrative
Procedure Act, and the courts have unanimously accepted hearsay material
in these proceedings.122 Specifically, in Richardson v. Perales, the Supreme
Court found that hearsay is “admissible up to the point of relevancy.”123
However, the current SEC Rule 320 raises concerns for two reasons. First,
the language provides a much lower admissibility bar than the Administrative
Procedure Act, and second, the application of Rule 320 falls short of the
fundamental fairness requirements also found in Richardson.
The Administrative Procedure Act’s guidelines for hearsay
admissibility include an additional requirement that all evidence be
sufficiently reliable such that its use is fair.124 This heightened standard is
important, as it can eliminate statements that are hearsay within hearsay,125

118

FED.R.EVID. 801(c).
FED.R.EVID. 802.
120
17 C.F.R. § 201.320 (2015).
121
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 410 (1971).
122
See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (2012) (describing the criteria for
the admissibility of evidence); Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 407-08 (1971)
(upholding constitutionality of hearsay evidence); Amendments to the Commission’s Rules
of Practice, 80 Fed. Reg. at 60,095 n.31 (recognizing the long history of hearsay use in
administrative proceedings).
123
402 U.S. 389, 410 (1971).
124
5 U.S.C. § 556(d)(2) (2012).
125
Anim v. Mukasey, 535 F.3d 243, 257 (4th Cir. 2008) (finding an official letter that was
“comprised entirely of multiple hearsay statements” insufficient indicia of reliability).
119
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letters by unidentified investigators,126 and testimony of co-defendants.127
Additionally, Richardson v. Perales was clear that there are boundaries to
“hearsay-when-relevant” usage. Richardson explained that “[t]he matter
comes down to the question of the procedure’s integrity and fundamental
fairness.”128 Only a fair procedure “does not fall short of procedural due
process,”129 and courts of appeals have recognized this key caveat and have
crafted holdings to recognize the necessity of fairness and reliability in
admitting hearsay.130
The original Rule 320, which provides that relevance is the sole
determinant in hearsay admissibility, fails to account for the requirements of
fairness and reliability, especially in light of other fairness concerns. The
amendment to Rule 320 seeks to heighten this standard of mere relevance to
also exclude any evidence that does not “bear[] satisfactory indicia of
reliability so that its use is fair.”131 This amendment correlates more closely
with the constitutionally appropriate Administrative Procedure Act132 and
incorporates the notions of fundamental fairness that are required in Perales.
However, the second, distinct question of fairness is still present. If
the administrative proceeding followed a pattern of objective and
dispassionate evidentiary rulings, then perhaps the proposed amendment
could alleviate all concern. Unfortunately, the SEC’s administrative
proceedings are not so judicious. The Commission, in its role of appellate
review, has instructed its administrative law judges to be incredibly liberal
when considering admissible evidence. Indeed, in the case In re Del Mar
Financial Services, Inc., the Commission clearly stated that “administrative
law judges should be inclusive in making evidentiary determinations in its
proceedings: ‘if in doubt, let it in.’”133 Essentially, this requires an ALJ to
defer to the relevancy determinations of the prosecuting SEC staff member.
126

Banat v. Holder, 557 F.3d 886, 892–93 (8th Cir. 2009).
Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530 (1986).
128
402 U.S. at 410.
129
Id.
130
See, e.g., Echostar Commc’n Corp., v. FCC, 292 F.3d 749, 753 (D.C. Cir. 2002)
(admitting hearsay if it there is “substantial evidence” that it is reliable trustworthy); J.A.M.
Builders, Inc. v. Herman, 233 F.3d 1350, 1354 (11th Cir. 2000) (admitting “reliable and
credible” hearsay); Calhoun v. Bailar, 626 F.2d 145, 149 (9th Cir. 1980).
131
Amendments to the Commission’s Rules of Practice, 80 Fed. Reg. at 60,095 n.31.
132
See, e.g., Calhoun, 626 F.2d at 148 (upholding the admissibility of hearsay evidence if “it
bear[s] satisfactory indicia of reliability” and is “probative and its use fundamentally fair”).
133
Del Mar Fin. Servs., Inc., Kevin C. Dills, Private Brokers Corp., Robert A. Roberts,
Matthew A. Jennings, Philip S. Brandon, and Jai Chauduri, Initial Decision Release No. 188,
75 SEC Docket 1473 (ALJ Aug. 14, 2001) (initial decision) (citing City of Anaheim, Order
Vacating Grant of Motion to Exclude Evidence, 71 SEC Docket 191, 193-94 (Nov. 16
127
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Richardson is clear that fairness is the key to process. When a
defendant faces an administrative judge who appears beholden to the
enforcement agency,134 the degree of discretion that the judge holds can be
daunting. Because the Commission has been clear that its administrative law
judges must be deferential to the relevancy determinations of the prosecutor,
the fairness of the process is diminished. Thus, although the proposed
amendment increases the relevancy standard, it is insufficient to alleviate
concerns that a biased judge will admit less probative or reliable evidence.
ii. Depositions
Next, the current Rules of Practice deviate from district court practice
in its proscription of depositions. While there is no specific limit to the
number of individuals who can be deposed in federal court,135 defendants are
barred from calling for any depositions for an administrative proceeding. This
proscription impinges on a defendant’s fundamental right “to present [his]
version of the facts.”136 This right can be broken into the two distinct ideas:
the right to challenge evidence, and the right to create an affirmative
defense.137 The ability to take depositions is an important aspect of both facets
of this right. Accordingly, many who represent corporate defendants have
balked at the lack of opportunity to craft a narrative wholly separate from that
of the prosecution.
Currently, Rule 233 only allows deposition by oral examination if the
witness will not be able to testify at the hearing.138 This severely limits the
ability for parties to develop arguments and defenses and intrudes upon a
defendant’s ability to create affirmative defenses, rather than merely relying
on the facts and written testimony presented by the SEC. This rule becomes
more problematic in light of the high standards for allowing crossexamination, which hinders a defendant’s ability to challenge evidence.139 If
a defendant has no authority with which to impeach a witness, he cannot show
credibility weaknesses in the Commission’s case.
1999)), rev’d on other grounds, Securities Act Release No. 33-8314, 81 SEC Docket 1195
(Oct. 24, 2003).
134
For a deeper discussion of perceived bias with the SEC’s administrative law judges, see
supra notes 63-85 and accompanying text.
135
FED.R.CIV.P. 30, 31.
136
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967) (overturning a conviction in which the
defendant was barred from presenting his chosen witnesses).
137
MAHONEY, supra note 116, at 1.
138
17 C.F.R. § 201.233(a)-(b) (2015).
139
17 C.F.R. § 201.326 (allowing cross-examination only if necessary to obtain “a full and
true disclosure of the facts”).
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Proposed Rule 233 greatly expands both parties’ ability to do this.
Under the proposed amendment, single-party defendants will now have the
opportunity to depose three witnesses and multi-party defendants will have the
opportunity to depose five.140 While a step in the right direction, this severe
limitation still deprives the defendant the opportunity to prepare her defense.
This proposal recognizes that different proceedings may require different
degrees of investigation and fact-finding to present an adequate defense. As the
Commission has already recognized the need for more depositions in complex
cases involving multi-party defendants, it follows that certain complex
proceedings may require a greater number of witness depositions.
Accordingly, this proposed amendment fails to adequately consider
the scope of certain cases, and could be augmented by granting an impartial
ALJ the discretion to determine how many depositions would be appropriate
in a given situation. However, as discussed previously, the ability to remedy
this shortcoming is beyond the control of the SEC and lies exclusively
Congress. To fix this concern, all the SEC can do is grant its administrative
judges the discretion to rule on motions for increased depositions. This, in
turn would only increase the objectivity concerns.
iii. Discovery and Disposition Time-Frame
A final fundamental factor in the concept of due process is the ability
for counsel to have adequate time to prepare a defense.141 The proposed
amendment to Rule 360, which governs the timeline for an administrative
proceeding, seeks to significantly extend the amount of time for discovery.142
A defendant would have one to four months to prepare for a sanction arising
out of registration violations, two and a half to six months for sanctions
arising out of injunctions or convictions, and four to eight months for cases
arising out of securities violations.143 The proposal also seeks to divorce the
deadline for ALJs to submit initial decisions from the pre-hearing period,144
which could allow more discretion on extensions.
Like hearsay, there is no strict due process violation for failing to
provide a specific amount of time to prepare for a case. Thus, while the time
140

Amendments to the Commission’s Rules of Practice, 80 Fed. Reg. at 60,092.
Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 450-52 (1940) (holding there was no due process
violation because counsel had access to all the necessary witnesses and facts within the timeperiod provided by the court).
142
Amendments to the Commission’s Rules of Practice, 80 Fed. Reg. at 60,093.
143
17 C.F.R §§ 201.221, .360(a) (2015). See also Amendments to the Commission’s Rules
of Practice, 80 Fed. Reg. at 60,104-05.
144
See Amendments to the Commission’s Rules of Practice, 80 Fed. Reg. at 60,092.
141
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period for discovery in the district court typically lasts one to two years,145
there is no per se constitutional problem in truncating the process for
administrative proceedings.146 Rather, like with hearsay, the district courts
rely heavily on individual trial judge discretion to determine whether the
accused can sufficiently prepare for trial.147 In these cases, the courts look at
the alleged crime and the asserted defenses.148
While there are not many cases that deal directly with this issue,
United States v. Sahley,149 a case from the Fifth Circuit, provides an
interesting example of how the abbreviated discovery phase can have
problematic constitutional outcomes. In Sahley, the defendant was tried for
making “a material false financial statement to a federally insured bank” in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1014.150 The defendant argued that denying a
continuance constituted a denial of his right to adequately prepare for trial.151
The Fifth Circuit ultimately held that the defendant’s rights were not violated,
as the judge acted within his discretion to determine the facts were
sufficiently straightforward so as not to warrant a continuance.152 However,
the Court also held that while there is no “constitutionally proscribed time
period” to prepare, “the answer [to determining how much time is sufficient]
must be found in the circumstances present in every case.”153
As the Commission has admitted, securities proceedings are vastly more
complicated than a simple bad-check case.154 The issues are complex and parties
are increasingly requesting additional time to sort through the mountains of
discovery documents disclosed by the Enforcement Division.155 In a district court
proceeding, defense counsel has significantly more time to prepare defenses and
145

See, e.g., FEDERMAN & SHERWOOD, supra note 77.
United States v. Sahley, 526 F.2d 913, 918 (5th Cir. 1976) (“[T]here is no constitutionally
proscribed time period . . . [or] mechanical tests for deciding when a denial of a continuance
is so arbitrary as to violate due process.”)
147
See Eubanks v. United States, 336 F.2d 269, 270 (9th Cir. 1964) (‘The determination as
to whether there was time sufficient to permit the accused to prepare his defense is largely a
matter of trial court discretion.”); Baldwin v. United States, 260 F.2d 117, 118 (4th Cir. 1958)
(deferring to the discretion of the district court judge to determine whether the defendant in
a bank theft was granted enough time to prepare his defense).
148
See, e.g., Eubanks, 336 F.2d at 270 (“What is a sufficient time in a particular case depends
upon the circumstances, including the nature of the charge, the issues presented, counsel's
familiarity with the applicable law and pertinent facts, and the availability of witnesses.”)
149
526 F.2d at 917.
150
Id. at 914.
151
Id. at 915.
152
Id. at 918.
153
Id. (citing Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589 (1964)).
154
See Amendments to the Commission’s Rules of Practice, 80 Fed. Reg. at 60,092.
155
See id.
146
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to compile evidence beyond the documents disclosed by the Commission,156
which is likely a significant factor in the SEC’s disproportionate success rate.
Proposed Rule 360 helps alleviate this concern by divorcing an ALJ’s deadline
for releasing an initial decision from other stages of the proceeding, which allows
for greater discretion to extend discovery time in complex cases.157 This helps
lessen the incongruities in each side’s ability to prepare.
However, the proposal retains the same amount of time to obtain
transcripts and submit post-hearing briefs as allowed by the original Rules of
Practice.158 The complexity and length of hearings and the issues presented vary
extraordinarily by case and so, while the proposed rule grants the ALJ the
discretion to extend the initial decision deadline 30 days,159 much of that time
would likely be used by the ALJ to read over the docket and weigh important
evidence rather than allowing parties additional time to gather evidence or
present their case. Parties on both sides would benefit by allowing an impartial
judge to determine on a case-by-case basis whether the parties should be granted
the extra time.
These concerns cast an unfortunate shadow over an otherwise wellreasoned and progressive proposal and could be fixed by granting an objective
judge greater discretion to allow sufficient process for each case. Because
Congress has made a policy choice that adequate representation must be
balanced with the public’s need for such cases to be quickly resolved160 and has
offered an alternative to Article III jurisdiction for these types of cases, the
correct answer cannot lie in removing cases to the district court. Nor is it
necessary – not every matter that goes before an ALJ is complex or requires
significantly more time for discovery than the rules allow.
However, these decisions require a dispassionate arbiter who can
make impartial decisions for each case. Currently, the SEC judges have a real
or perceived interest in the disposition of the case. An administrative law
judge that is either perceived to be or actually beholden to the Commissioners
cannot alleviate the lingering procedural concerns that are still present in the
proposed amendments, and the SEC does not have the power to fix this
problem. As Congress has made the policy decision to create administrative
courts to quickly resolve burdens, it lies with that body to ensure defendants
receive adequate due process in that forum. The following Section will
discuss how Congress can achieve this goal.
156
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IV. EVENING THE HOME FIELD ADVANTAGE
The proposed amendments will not be enough to alleviate the
procedural concerns currently embedded in the SEC’s administrative
proceedings. Administrative law judges need more discretion to make casespecific determinations that maximize fairness, but the judges themselves
cannot be entrusted to make those determinations when there is a deep-rooted
concern that they are not free to make unbiased decisions. To lessen the
concern of impartial judges and ensure that each defendant is afforded the
process that he or she requires, ALJs should be (1) completely insulated from
appointment and removal by their department, and (2) formally removed
from the bureaucracy of the agency in which they preside.
Before discussing how Congress and the administrative state can
accomplish these goals, it is important to note a constitutional challenge
gaining traction with SEC defendants that has received favorable recognition
in the district courts and affects the availability of certain remedies to the ALJ
objectivity problem. Several defendants have recently attacked the legitimacy
of the SEC’s administrative law judges, claiming that they are
unconstitutionally appointed as inferior officers under Article II.161 In Hill v.
SEC, a district court judge for the North District of Georgia granted
defendants a preliminary injunction to enjoin an administrative proceeding
before an SEC administrative judge on the likelihood that this argument
would succeed on the merits.162 While this constitutional problem is likely to
be easily remedied through a change in the hiring process, it does have greater
implications when seeking to rid the bias from the administrative court.
Article II requires inferior officers to be appointed by the President
alone, the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments,163 and applies to
agency officers whose functions are “predominantly quasi-legislative or
quasi-judicial.”164 Furthermore, “any appointee exercising significant
authority pursuant to the laws of the United States is an ‘Officer of the United
States,’ and must, therefore, be appointed in the manner prescribed” by
161

U.S. CONST. Art. II, § 2, cl. 2. See, e.g., Tilton v. SEC, No. 15-CV-2472 RA, 2015 WL
4006165, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 30, 2015); Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part
Plaintiff Charles L. Hill, Jr.’s Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order, Or in the
Alternative, a Preliminary Injunction, Hill v. SEC, 114 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1305 (N.D. Ga.
2015); Duka v. SEC, 103 F. Supp. 3d 382, 393 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
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Supp. 3d at 1320.
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Article II.165 In Hill, the district court relied primarily on Freytag v.
Commissioner, which held that a special trial judge for the tax court was an
inferior officer because the role exercised “significant authority,” to
determine that SEC ALJ’s were inferior officers.166 The court also noted that
“district-court clerks, thousands of clerks within the Treasury and Interior
Departments, an assistant surgeon, a cadet-engineer, election monitors,
federal marshals, [and] military judges” were considered inferior officers.167
While other courts have declined to accept this argument,168 it does
create a wrinkle in certain paths to removing the bias from SEC
ALJs. Currently, potential ALJs are screened through the U.S. Office of
Personnel Management, which sends a short list of candidates to the Chief
Administrative Law Judge.169 The Chief Judge then selects the top three
candidates from that list and, with an interview committee, makes a
preliminary selection that is approved by the Commission’s Office of
Human Resources.170 Once hired, ALJs are only removable by the
Commission for “good cause,” which is established by an independent
federal agency.171
If the courts ultimately rule that the administrative judges are inferior
officers, then only the President, the Commission, or a “Court of Law” can
appoint them.172 However, appointment by the Commission, which is the
most likely modification and the recommended course of action by the judge
in Hill,173 would simply aggravate the bias of the administrative court.
Because the Commissioners can only be removed for cause,174 the ALJs
would lose their current removal protections. Under Free Enterprise Fund v.
165

Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 881 (1991) (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 126).
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PCAOB, there cannot be a “double-layer” of protection from removal by the
President, which means that an entity (like the Commission) with the power
to remove an inferior officer who can only be removed for cause (like an
ALJ) cannot itself only be removed for cause (as the Commissioners are).175
To remedy the double-layer protection issue, either the Commissioners or the
ALJs would need to be removable without cause, which would augment
objectivity concerns by including an actual fear of being fired. It is unlikely
that the Commissioners would ever lose their for-cause removal status and
so, ironically, adherence to the Constitution would only increase the ALJs’
perceived or real pressures and biases.
And yet something must be done. The Commission’s administrative
law courts operate with, at the very least, an image of favoritism towards its
own prosecutors,176 and due process cannot tolerate even the perception of
a tribunal with pervasive bias. Our current bureaucratic framework breeds
this perception. Whether or not ALJs can be removed without cause, SEC
ALJs do not enjoy life tenure, are hired internally by the Chief
Administrative Law Judge, and are—to an extent—subject to removal by
the same Commissioners who determine which cases should be brought
before them.177
There is a simple solution to alleviating the impartiality concern, but
this remedy could not come from within the administrative agency. Rather,
Congress must remove the possibility that ALJs are unduly influenced by the
Commission or any administrative agency which holds hearings involving a
potential assessment of penalties or fines and in which due process must be
granted.
To do this, Congress would need to pass legislation to create an entirely
distinct Department of Administrative Courts that is responsible for the
appointment, removal, and payment of all administrative law judges in Article I
tribunals. This Department would be run by a Director whose appointment
conforms to the requirements for “Officers of the United States,”178 and who
would be removable at will under Article II. The Office of Personnel
Management would retain its primary role of administering qualitative exams,
175
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ranking applicants, and producing a list of finalists for review.179 This list of
finalists would be sent to the Director, who would appoint all administrative law
judges presiding over hearings in a particular agency. Each ALJ would continue
to be removable only for cause. The changes would, in a simple form, change
the location of the SEC’s Office of ALJ’s as follows:

Under this framework, Congress could alleviate the concerns
of partiality in the administrative process while maintaining fidelity
to the constitutional “double-layer” proscription in PCAOB. This removal
framework would also alleviate concerns that specific ALJs would be
terminated as political attitudes shift but ensure that the courts remained
balanced as new Presidents appoint Directors with different political
leanings. Other than appointment and removal, each ALJ and agency court
would function under the same regulations it currently functions.
This transition could be easily achieved without uprooting the
framework by which each specific administrative court functions. Currently,
there are 34 federal agencies that employ administrative law judges,
including the SEC, CTFC, EPA, DEA, the Social Security Administration
and the Postal Service.180 As of 2009, these 34 agencies employed 1,422
administrative law judges.181 Each judge works primarily with the Office of
Personnel Management for the initial portion of their hiring process as well
179
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as for compensation disbursement for all ALJs, regardless of agency182 and
within their own agency-specific Office of Administrative Law Judges. These
offices need only be transplanted from within the specific agency into the
new Department of Administrative Law Judges, which would not upend the
bureaucracy within the agency systems.
Because the threat to an ALJ’s objectivity lie with soft, institutional
power and pressure, formal removal from within the agency from which the
ALJ’s cases originate can remove undue influence from administrative
proceedings. SEC Commissioners do not only serve as appellate review for
cases. They also function as overseers of the SEC prosecutors and all
rulemaking. In this position of legislator, prosecutor, judge, and jury, it is
apparent why term-specified administrative judges may feel unduly
pressured. As we believe is true of Article III courts, judicial independence
from both the legislators and prosecutors is a fundamental aspect of
objectivity, and can be easily achieved here.
Adding a Department of Administrative Law Judges would remove
the appearance of ALJs who feel beholden to the departments in which they
preside, alleviate the double-layer protection concerns described in Free
Enterprise, and retain they necessary for-cause removal protection that the
judges need to impartially decide cases. Once the perception of bias is
removed, the SEC’s administrative court operates very similarly to other
agency’s administrative proceedings.183 With confidence restored in the
judge’s ability to decide cases, the proposed amendments do a good deal to
even the playing field in the Commission’s administrative courts and would
only be enhanced by greater judicial discretion.
V. CONCLUSION
With the passage of Dodd-Frank, the caseload for the SEC’s Division of
Enforcement increased dramatically. This, in turn, resulted in a fundamental shift
in the agency’s forum choices for bringing cases. For defendants in these cases,
this is an unwelcome shift, as Commission prosecutors win in this forum at much
higher rates when compared to the district court. In response to increased
pressure from the media, Congress, former commissioners, and constitutional
attacks in district court, the SEC has offered several important improvements to
its administrative proceedings’ Rules of Practice.
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Unfortunately, none of these improvements reach the underlying
issue. There is sufficient evidence to cause serious concern that the SEC
administrative law judges feel in many ways beholden to the Commission
and therefore cannot act as impartial judges before the tribunal. This concern
diminishes the value of any proposed amendment. Congress has recognized
the policy need for a quick resolution of securities violations, which must be
balanced by due process and the ability of respondents to adequately prepare
a defense. To expeditiously handle such an immense caseload, ALJs must
have the necessary discretion to – within reason – determine the needs of each
individual case.
This cannot be done without an impartial administrative judge. So,
although the proposals to allow depositions, increase discovery, and heighten
evidentiary standards are positive steps and could be augmented by further
judicial discretion to make decisions that fit the needs of the party, real reform
remains elusive, and the Commission cannot provide a rule change to achieve
it. To do so, administrative law judges must be removed from undue influence
by the SEC. This requires congressional action, who alone can completely
divorce the appointment and removal process from the agencies in which the
judges work and remove administrative judges from the undue influences that
diminish a defendant’s right to due process.

